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Abstract. The problem of sharing the cost of a common infrastructure
among a set of strategic and cooperating players has been the subject of
intensive research in recent years. However, most of these studies consider
cooperative cost sharing games in an offline setting, i.e., the mechanism
knows all players and their respective input data in advance. In this pa-
per, we consider cooperative cost sharing games in an online setting:
Upon the arrival of a new player, the mechanism has to take instan-
taneous and irreversible decisions without any knowledge about players
that arrive in the future. We propose an online model for general demand
cost sharing games and give a perfect characterization of both weakly
group-strategyproof and group-strategyproof online cost sharing mech-
anisms for this model. Moreover, we present a simple method to derive
incremental online cost sharing mechanisms from online algorithms such
that the competitive ratio is preserved. Based on our general results, we
develop online cost sharing mechanisms for several binary demand and
general demand cost sharing games.
1 Introduction
The pivotal point in mechanism design is to achieve a global objective even
though part of the input information is owned by selfish players. In cost sharing,
the aim is to share the cost of a common service in a fair manner while the
players’ valuations for the service are private information. Based on the declared
bids of the players, a cost sharing mechanism has to determine a service allo-
cation and distribute the incurred cost among the served players. In many cost
sharing games, the common service is represented by a combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem like minimum Steiner tree, machine scheduling, etc., which defines
a cost for every possible service allocation. We consider cooperative cost sharing
games, i.e., players may form coalitions to coordinate their bidding strategies.
During the last decade, there has been substantial research on binary demand
cost sharing games, where a service allocation determines simply whether or not
a player is served. In this paper, we consider the general demand setting in which
players require not only one but several levels of service and the mechanism has
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to determine which service level is granted to each player and at what price.
We assume that players are concerned about the quantity of service levels they
obtain, e.g., the number of distinct connections to a source, executions of their
job, etc. Moreover, once a player’s request for a certain service level was refused,
she will not be granted a higher level. This general demand cost sharing model
has recently been investigated quite intensively; see [1, 3, 9, 10].
To the best of our knowledge, all previous studies of cooperative cost sharing
games considered offline settings, where the entire input instance is known in
advance. That is, the mechanism has complete information about the input data
associated with every player (bids for different service levels and other relevant
player characteristics) that can be taken into account in order to determine the
allocation and payment scheme. However, several natural cost sharing games in-
herently bear an online characteristic in the sense that players arrive over time
and reveal their input data only at their arrival. In such settings, the mecha-
nism needs to take instantaneous and irreversible decisions with respect to the
assigned service level and payment of the player without any knowledge about
players that arrive in the future.
Problems in which the input data is revealed gradually and irreversible de-
cisions have to be taken without further knowledge of future requests are the
subject of online computation [2]. The standard yardstick to assess the quality of
an online algorithm is by means of its competitive ratio, i.e., the worst case ratio
of the cost of the solution produced by the online algorithm compared to the
cost of an optimal offline algorithm that knows the entire input data in advance.
Our Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We propose the first online model for general demand cost sharing games:
In its most general form, every player arrives several times to request an
additional service level. Upon the arrival of a player, the online mechanism
immediately determines a price for her new request. We require that at each
point of time, the sum of the collected payments approximates the cost of
the (optimal offline) solution for the current allocation.
2. We give a perfect characterization of both weakly group-strategyproof and
group-strategyproof (formal definitions are given below) online mechanisms
for the online general demand cost sharing game: We show that online cost
sharing mechanisms are automatically weakly group-strategyproof for online
binary demand games. In the general demand case, this is true if the marginal
costs of the underlying cost function are increasing. Moreover, we prove
necessary and sufficient conditions for group-strategyproofness of online cost
sharing mechanisms.
3. We present a simple yet effective method to derive online cost sharing mecha-
nisms from competitive online algorithms: Given a ρ-competitive algorithm
for the underlying problem, we show that the induced incremental online
mechanism is ρ-budget balanced at all times. Together with the above char-
acterization, this enables us to derive online mechanisms for several binary
demand and general demand cost sharing games for network design and
scheduling problems. For example, we obtain an O(log2 |V |)-budget balanced
group-strategyproof online mechanism for the online binary demand Steiner
forest cost sharing game, where V denotes the set of vertices of the under-
lying graph.
Related Work. Moulin [10] introduced incremental cost sharing mechanisms
in the offline setting. He studies fully budget balanced cost sharing mecha-
nisms in two polar cases with respect to the underlying cost function. He states
that if the cost function is supermodular and marginal costs are increasing,
essentially only incremental mechanisms can be group-strategyproof. On the
other hand, if the cost function is submodular and marginal costs are decreas-
ing, all cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for binary demand games yield
group-strategyproof mechanisms, but almost only sequential stand alone mecha-
nisms (a particularly simple subclass of incremental mechanisms) can be group-
strategyproof for general demand cost sharing games.
We complement Moulin’s results by studying the submodular case with in-
creasing marginal costs: We define incremental mechanisms slightly differently
in that they accept requests in the borderline cases in which a player’s bid
equals the offered price. This small difference allows us to guarantee the strong
notion of group-strategyproofness for all incremental mechanisms in this case
while achieving weak group-strategyproofness for the whole class of games with
increasing marginal cost functions.
Independently of our work, Juarez studied group-strategyproofness of binary
demand cost sharing games in an unpublished work [8].
2 Online General Demand Cost Sharing Games
We first review offline general demand cost sharing games as studied in [1, 3, 9,
10]. Let U be a set of players that are interested in a common service. In a general
demand cost sharing game, every player has valuations for a finite number of
service levels, i.e. the maximum service level requested is bounded by a constant
L ∈ N. Let (i, l) denote player i’s request for service level l. Each player i ∈ U
has a valuation vector vi ∈ RL+, where vi,l denotes how much more (additive)
player i likes service level l compared to service level l−1. The valuation vectors
are private information, i.e. vi is known to i only. Additionally, each player i
announces a bid vector bi ∈ RL+. bi,l represents the maximum price player i is
willing to pay for service level l (in addition to service level l − 1).
An allocation of goods or service to the set of players U is denoted by a
vector x ∈ NU0 , where xi ∈ N0 indicates the level of service that player i obtains;
here xi = 0 represents that i does not receive any good or service. Note that
as a characteristic of this model, only subsequent service levels can be allocated
to a player (i.e. if a player obtains service level l, then she also obtains service
levels 1, . . . , l − 1). We denote by ei ∈ NU0 the ith unit vector.
The servicing cost of an allocation x ∈ NU0 is given by a cost function
C : NU0 → R+. We assume that C is non-decreasing in every component and
C(0) = 0 for the all-zero allocation 0. In the examples we study, the common
service is represented by a combinatorial optimization problem like e.g. Steiner
tree, machine scheduling, etc. In these cases, we define C(x) as the cost of an
offline optimal solution to the underlying optimization problem.
A general demand cost sharing mechanism solicits the bid vectors bi from
all players i ∈ U , and computes a service allocation x ∈ NU0 and (non-negative)
payments φi,l ∈ R for every player i ∈ U and service level l ≤ L. We assume
that the mechanism complies with the following standard assumptions:
1. Individual rationality : A player is charged only for service levels that she
receives, and for any service level, her payment is at most her bid, i.e. for all
i, l: φi,l = 0 if xi < l and φi,l ≤ bi,l if xi ≥ l.
2. No positive transfer : A player is not paid for receiving service, i.e. φi,l ≥ 0
for all i, l.
For notational convenience, we define vi,0 = φi,0 = 0 for all players i ∈ U .
Let C̄(x) denote the cost of the actually computed solution for allocation x.
A cost sharing mechanism is β-budget balanced if the total payment obtained






φi,l ≤ β · C(x).
If β = 1, we simply call the cost sharing mechanism budget balanced.
We assume that players act strategically and every player’s goal is to maxi-





Since the outcome (x, φ) computed by the mechanism solely depends on the
bids b of the players (and not on their true valuations), a player may have an
incentive to declare a bid vector bi that differs from her true valuation vector vi.
We say that a mechanism is strategyproof if bidding truthfully is a dominant
strategy for every player. That is, for every player i ∈ U and every two bid
vectors b,b′ with bi = vi and bj = b
′
j for all j 6= i, we have ui(x, φ) ≥ ui(x′, φ′),
where (x, φ) and (x′, φ′) are the solutions output by the mechanism for bid
vectors b and b′, respectively. Note that in our model, a player cannot lie about
the characteristics or arrival times of her requests.
In cooperative mechanism design, it is assumed that players can form coali-
tions in order to coordinate their bids. A mechanism is group-strategyproof if no
coordinated bidding of a coalition S ⊆ U can ever strictly increase the utility of
some player in S without strictly decreasing the utility of another player in S.
More formally, for every coalition S ⊆ U and every two bid vectors b,b′ with
bi = vi for every i ∈ S and bi = b′i for every i /∈ S, if there is some i ∈ S
with ui(x
′, φ′) > ui(x, φ) then there is some j ∈ S with ui(x′, φ′) < ui(x, φ).
A mechanism is weakly group-strategyproof if no coordinated bidding can ever
strictly increase the utility of every player in a coalition. That is, for every coali-
tion S ⊆ U and every two bid vectors b,b′ with bi = vi for every i ∈ S and
bi = b
′
i for every i /∈ S, there is some i ∈ S with ui(x′, φ′) ≤ ui(x, φ). Intuitively,
weak group-strategyproofness suffices if we assume that players adopt a slightly
more conservative attitude with respect to their willingness of joining a coalition:
While in the group-strategyproof setting a player will participate in a coalition
even if her utility is not affected, she only participates if she is strictly better off
in the weakly group-strategyproof setting.
We now extend general demand cost sharing games to an online scenario [2].
Many cost sharing games studied in the literature are derived from combinatorial
optimization problems. We take this as a motivation to define online cost sharing
games very generally with respect to the varying online characteristics inherited
from different online optimization problems.
In our model, an online mechanism must immediately fix the payment for a
requested service at the point of time when it is revealed, without any knowledge
about future requests. In line with the offline model, we assume that an online
mechanism will never accept any further requests from a player that has previ-
ously been rejected. When the cost sharing game is derived from a combinatorial
optimization problem, the mechanism has to maintain a (possibly suboptimal)
feasible solution for the current service allocation. We allow the online solution
to be modified as in the underlying online optimization problem.
Following Borodin et al. [2], we describe an online list model as a basic
example. Here, service requests (i, l) arrive according to an online list. (Note
that for certain problems like online scheduling, jobs may have release dates
which are then treated as arrival times of the respective requests.) Upon arrival,
the player reveals the characteristic of her new request (the input information
for the underlying combinatorial optimization problem) and her bid bi,l. Each
time a new request arrives, the respective player is offered an additional level of
service for a price p that may depend on previous inputs and decisions only. If her
bid bi,l is larger or equal to this price, the request is accepted and added to the
current allocation. Otherwise, the request is rejected and all further appearances
of player i are implicitly deleted from the online list (formally, we may define
p = ∞ for all subsequent requests of player i). Algorithm 1 gives a more formal
description.
Let xt denote the current allocation after processing request t ∈ T = {1, 2, . . .}.
Let C̄(xt) denote the cost of the actually computed solution for xt. We call an
online cost-sharing mechanism β-budget balanced at all times for some β ≥ 1 if







φi,l ≤ β · C(xt).
The conditions of individual rationality and no positive transfer as well as the
different forms of incentive compatibility transfer in a straightforward way.
Algorithm 1: Online general demand cost sharing mechanism.
Input: online cost sharing game
Output: allocation vector x = (xi)i∈U , payment vector φ = (φi,l)i∈U,l≤L
Initialize x0 = 01
forall requests t ∈ T do2
Read out input data and bid bi,l of newly arrived request t =: (i, l).3
Determine payment p for new request.4
if bi,l ≥ p then set x
t = xt−1 + ei and φi,l = p5
else set xt = xt−1 and φi,l = 0, and ignore all further appearances of6
player i.
end7
Output allocation vector x and payments φ8
3 Incentive Compatibility
The following characterizations hold for all online mechanisms in our framework.
Note that the requirements for group-strategyproofness highly depend on the
fact that requests are accepted if the announced bid is equal to the offered price.
3.1 Strategyproofness
To achieve strategyproofness, we need to bound the increase in marginal valu-
ations of individual players. As expressed by Fact 1 below, this is essential to
prevent players from overbidding for some level to obtain positive utility for
higher levels. In previous works on general demand cost sharing [1, 9], players’
valuations were assumed to be non-increasing. However, we can slightly relax
this condition by introducing a positive factor λ:
Definition 1. A valuation vector vi ∈ RL is λ-decreasing if for all 1 < l ≤ L,
vi,l ≤ λ · vi,l−1.
Given λ-decreasing valuations for all players, an online mechanism is guaranteed
to be weakly group-strategyproof if and only if the induced cost shares grow
faster than the valuations (the proof is given in Section 3.2):
Definition 2. A cost sharing mechanism has λ-increasing prices if for every bid
vector b and player i ∈ U , the price for any service level 1 < l ≤ L is at least λ
times the price for the previous service level, i.e.
φi,l(b) ≥ λ · φi,l−1(b).
We would like to remark that the above conditions can be further generalized by
letting λ vary for every player (and/or level) or by adding constant terms to the
right hand sides. However, the following fact emphasizes that a set of conditions












Fig. 1. An example for λ-decreasing valuations and λ-increasing prices with λ = 1
Fact 1 A general demand online mechanism is not strategyproof if cost shares
do not increase by more than valuations per service level.
Proof. We assume for simplicity that there is only one player. Further, assume
that for some service level l, φl(b) < λ · φl−1(b), say the difference is λ. By
individual rationality, we know that x(b) ≥ l−1. Since the mechanism is online,
φl(b) does not depend on bl and we can assume that bl > φl(b).
We define the player’s valuations as vl−1 = φl−1(b) − ǫ, vl = λ · vl−1 and
vk = φk(b) for k < l− 1. Thus, the valuation increases by a factor λ when going
from level l − 1 to level l, whereas the prices increase by less than a factor λ.
With this valuation vector, the player obtains positive utility in the run on b:
u(b) = 0+ul−1(b)+ul(b) = −ǫ+λ(φl−1(b)−ǫ)−(λφl−1(b)−δ) = δ−(λ+1)ǫ >
0 for sufficiently small ǫ. On the other hand, she gets zero utility if she bids
truthfully, hence the mechanism is not strategyproof. The same argumentation
can be pursued with additive instead of multiplicative increase. ⊓⊔
3.2 Weak Group-Strategyproofness
We now prove that in fact, under the above conditions, every online mechanism
is weakly group-strategyproof.
Theorem 1. If valuations are λ-decreasing, a general demand online cost shar-
ing mechanism with λ-increasing prices is weakly group-strategyproof.
Proof. Fix a coalition S ⊆ U and a bid vector b with bi = vi for all i ∈ S.
Assume for contradiction that all members of the coalition can strictly increase
their utilities by changing their bids to b′ (while bi = b
′
i for all i /∈ S). Let (i, l)
be the first request for which the mechanism makes different decisions in the
runs on b and b′. We have φi,l(b) = φi,l(b
′) since all previous decisions of the
mechanism were equal in both runs. There are two possible cases:
1. vi,l < φi,l ≤ b′i,l. Because of λ-decreasing valuations and λ-increasing prices,
we have . . . ≤ λ−2vi,l+2 ≤ λ−1vi,l+1 ≤ vi,l < φi,l(b′) ≤ λ−1φi,l+1(b′) ≤
λ−2φi,l+2(b
′) ≤ . . . , and hence player i has negative utility for service levels
l and higher in the run on b′, whereas the utility for each level is non-negative
when bidding truthfully.
2. b′i,l < φi,l ≤ vi,l. Then, player i obtains only l − 1 levels of service in the
run on b′, whereas she gets additional utility by accepting level l in the run
on b.
Consequently, player i gets less or equal utility in the run on b′, a contradiction
to the assumption. ⊓⊔
Remark that for binary demand cost sharing games, both Definitions 1 and 2
are always fulfilled since there is only one level of service. Hence, binary demand
online cost sharing mechanisms are always weakly group-strategyproof.
3.3 Group-Strategyproofness
In order to ensure the stronger notion of group-strategyproofness, we need to
prevent that dropping out, like in the second case of the proof of Theorem 1, can
help subsequent players. Towards this end, we need the following property of
cross-monotonicity, which is equivalent to Moulin’s submodular costs condition
and generalizes the well-known notion of cross-monotonicity for binary demand
cost sharing games [10].
Consider a fixed instance of an online cost sharing game and let φi,l(b) denote
the price that player i is offered for service level l when b is the bid vector input
to the mechanism. Throughout this section, we assume λ-decreasing valuations
and λ-increasing prices.
Definition 3. An online mechanism is cross-monotonic if for every player i ∈ U
and service level l, the offered price does not decrease when a subset of requests
are accepted in previous iterations, i.e.
φi,l(b
′) ≥ φi,l(b)
for all bid vectors b,b′ such that xt−1(b′) ≤ xt−1(b), where (i, l) is request t.
This condition is a sufficient for an online cost sharing mechanism to be
group-strategyproof. The main proof ideas are the following: First, dropping out
can never help others since it only increases cost shares of subsequent bidders.
Second, the first member of a coalition who overbids for an additional level of
service can only decrease her utility by doing this, since prices increase more
than valuations in terms of service levels.
Theorem 2. If valuations are λ-decreasing, a general demand online cost shar-
ing mechanism with λ-increasing prices is group-strategyproof if it is cross-monotonic.
Proof. Fix a coalition S ⊆ U and a bid vector b with bi = vi for all i ∈ S.
Assume that every member of the coalition increases or maintains her utility
when the coalition changes their bids to b′ (while bi = b
′
i for all i /∈ S).
We first prove that xt(b′) ≤ xt(b) for all t ∈ T . Assume for contradiction that
there is a request which is accepted in the run on b′ but not in the run on b.
Let (i, l) be the earliest such request, say request t. That is, xτ (b′) ≤ xτ (b)
for all τ < t. By cross-monotonicity, we have φi,l(b
′) ≥ φi,l(b). Since players
outside the coalition submit the same bids in both runs, player i must be a
member of the coalition to gain service in the run on b′. But then, φi,l(b
′) ≥
φi,l(b) > bi,l = vi,l and hence by λ-decreasing valuations and λ-increasing prices,
player i has negative utility for service levels l and higher in the run on b′.
Since xτ (b′) ≤ xτ (b) for all τ < t, by cross-monotonicity φi,k(b′) ≥ φi,k(b)
for all k < l as well, and therefore ui(b
′) < ui(b), a contradiction to the first
assumption.
We can conclude that xt(b′) ≤ xt(b) for all t ∈ T . Hence, φi,l(b′) ≥ φi,l(b)






(vi,l − φi,l(b′)) ≤
xi(b)∑
l=1
(vi,l − φi,l(b)) = ui(b)
for all i and l, hence we obtain group-strategyproofness. ⊓⊔
We prove next that Theorem 2 actually holds in an if and only if fashion,
even in the binary demand case.
Theorem 3. An binary demand online mechanism is not group-strategyproof if
it is not cross-monotonic.
Proof. Consider an online mechanism that is not cross-monotonic; let L = 1.
That is, there are bid vectors b,b′ with xt−1(b′) ≤ xt−1(b) and φi(b′) < φi(b)
for some player i. For simplicity, assume that i is the last player in the online
instance. Since the mechanism is online, φi(b
′) does not depend on b′i, so we can
assume that b′i = φi(b). We will define valuations such that there is a coalition
S which has an incentive to misreport their valuations.
Define S := {j ∈ U | bj 6= b′j} ∪ {i}. Assume that all j ∈ U \ S bid bj = b′j .
Now, define vj := φj(b) for all j ∈ S. Observe that if all players in S bid
truthfully, the outcome of the mechanism is the same as for bid vector b. Now,
if the coalition changes their bids to b′, some players j ∈ S \ {i} lose service
but all retain their previous utility of zero. Meanwhile, player i increases her
utility from zero to φi(b) − φi(b′) > 0. Hence, the mechanism is not group-
strategyproof. ⊓⊔
4 Incremental Online Mechanisms
In this section, we describe how to turn competitive online algorithms into in-
cremental online cost sharing mechanisms. Given a combinatorial optimization
problem P and a ρ-competitive online algorithm alg for this problem, we define
an online mechanism for the corresponding cost sharing game which is ρ-budget
balanced at all times. This mechanism is weakly group-strategyproof if the algo-
rithm’s marginal costs are increasing, which is gratuitous in the binary demand
case.
Let alg be a ρ-competitive algorithm for an online combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem P. Consider an instance I of P. The incremental online mechanism
induced by alg works as follows: Requests arrive according to I. Each time a
new request arrives, we simulate alg on the online instance induced by the re-
quests that have previously been accepted plus the new item. The price p for the
additional service level is set to be the incremental cost caused by the update in
the competitive algorithm. We call an online algorithm alg cross-monotonic if
the induced incremental online mechanism is cross-monotonic.
It is straightforward to see that the budget balance factor of the incremental
online mechanism is inherited from the competitive ratio of the input algorithm:
Lemma 1. The incremental online mechanism is ρ-budget balanced at all times.





l=1 φi,l = C̄(x
t),
since every accepted player pays exactly the incremental cost for adding her to








φi,l ≤ ρ · C(xt),
which proves ρ-budget balance at all times. ⊓⊔
4.1 Binary Demand Examples
We now apply our framework to competitive online algorithms for several com-
binatorial optimization problems. In this section, we give examples for binary
demand cost sharing games, i.e. the maximum service level is L = 1 and every
player has only one request.
Online Scheduling. Consider the parallel machine scheduling problem with
the objective of minimizing the makespan. Any list scheduling algorithm has
an approximation factor of at most 2 for this problem. Hence, the online al-
gorithm that adds each arriving job to the machine with the currently least
load is 2-competitive. Unfortunately, it is not cross-monotonic as deleting jobs
can cause higher or lower completion times for subsequent jobs. Nonetheless,
our framework leads to a 2-budget balanced, weakly group-strategyproof online
mechanism. Note that in this scenario, jobs do not have release dates and so the
online order is not coupled with scheduling time.
Corollary 1. There is a 2-budget balanced weakly group-strategyproof incremen-
tal online mechanism for the minimum makespan scheduling problem on parallel
machines P | |Cmax.
Online Steiner Tree and Forest. Given an undirected graph G with edge
costs, connection requests arrive online. In the Steiner forest problem, each re-
quest consists of a pair of vertices si, ti; in the Steiner tree problem, all requests
have one vertex in common, i.e. si = sj for all i, j ∈ U . The goal is to select a
minimum cost set of edges such that each vertex pair is connected by a path.
Let n denote the number of players or commodities.
The online greedy Steiner tree algorithm picks the shortest path to the cur-
rent tree each time a new commodity arrives. It has a competitive ratio of
log n, while the competitive ratio of any online algorithm is shown to be at
least 1/2 log n [7]. Hence, our framework gives a weakly group-strategyproof
Θ(log n)-budget balanced online cost sharing mechanism for the Steiner tree
problem, which is asymptotically best possible. The greedy algorithm for the
online Steiner forest problem achieves an approximation ratio of O(log2 n).
Corollary 2. There is an O(log2 n)-budget balanced weakly group-strategyproof
incremental online mechanism for the Steiner forest game. This mechanism is
(log n)-budget balanced for the Steiner tree game.
Unfortunately, the greedy algorithm is not cross-monotonic, as dropping out
of players can provoke others to switch their paths, which in turn can have ar-
bitrary effects on the costs incurred by subsequent players. This issue can be
overcome if paths are unambiguous; e.g. if G = (V, E) is a forest, the above
mechanisms are group-strategyproof. Pushing this observation even further, we
obtain an O(log |V |)-budget balanced group-strategyproof mechanism for the
Steiner forest game if the underlying graph is known in advance: We use the
oblivious online Steiner forest algorithm proposed by Gupta et al. [5] which
connects every arriving vertex pair by a predefined path which depends on the
underlying graph only. We remark that the online notion is here somewhat per-
turbed as G needs to be known beforehand.
Corollary 3. There is an O(log2 |V |)-budget balanced group-strategyproof incre-
mental online mechanism for the Steiner forest game, where V is the vertex set
of the underlying graph.
4.2 General Demand Examples
In this section, we exploit the whole range of our framework by deriving incre-
mental mechanisms for general demand cost sharing games. In the first example,
players are assumed to arrive only once with the complete list of their requests,
while in the second example, the arrival sequence is mixed, i.e. players can takes
turns announcing additional requests.
Online Preemptive Scheduling. A common problem in preemptive schedul-
ing is the parallel machine setting in which each job has a release date. The cost
of a solution is given by the sum of all completion times. The single machine
case is solved optimally by the shortest remaining processing time (srpt) algo-
rithm [11]. srpt is a 2-approximation algorithm for the parallel machine case [4].
In the corresponding scheduling game, we treat the release date of a job as its
arrival time in the cost sharing framework. The cost C̄ of an allocation x is the
total cost of the srpt schedule for x. Whenever a job arrives, the srpt solution
is updated by adding the new job, and the resulting increase in total cost is set
to be the cost share for this request.
In our model, each player may request multiple executions of their job.
E.g. consider a student who asks a copy shop to print and bind several copies of
his master’s thesis, or a joinery is asked to produce a few of the same individ-
ual piece of furniture. In these scenarios, it is very natural to assume that the
marginal valuation for each additional copy is decreasing, i.e. vi,l ≥ vi,l+1 for
all i, l. We assume that each player arrives only once with all her requests. In
scheduling terms, each player owns several jobs which all have the same release
date and processing time. Before subsequent players arrive, the srpt algorithm
schedules all of player i’s jobs subsequently, hence each of them delays the same
number of jobs, and later copies have larger completion times. Therefore, the
general demand incremental online mechanism induced by srpt has increasing
marginal prices, and we obtain:
Corollary 4. There is a 2-budget balanced weakly group-strategyproof general
demand incremental online mechanism for the preemptive scheduling problem
with release dates P |ri, pmtn|
∑
Ci. This mechanism is budget balanced in the
single machine case.
Online Multicommodity Routing. In an online multicommodity routing
problem, we are given a directed graph with monotonically increasing cost func-
tions on each arc. Commodities arrive online and request routing of l units of
capacity from some vertex to another. We assume that the routing is splittable
in integer units. The greedy algorithm which routes each unit of flow separately
in an optimal way is (3 + 2
√
2)-competitive for this problem [6]. It is clear that
marginal costs are increasing, since the cost functions on each arc grow with
increasing traffic. This is true even when players arrive in a mixed order and re-
quest to route additional units between their source-destination pair. However,
this is a congestion-type game (the more players in the game, the higher the
costs per request), and so we cannot expect group-strategyproofness.
Corollary 5. There is a (3 + 2
√
2)-budget balanced weakly group-strategyproof
incremental online mechanism for the online multicommodity routing problem in
which each player arrives multiple times.
5 Conclusion
We characterized strategyproofness, weak group-strategyproofness and group-
strategyproofness of mechanisms in a new framework for online general demand
cost sharing games. Quite surprisingly, weak group-strategyproofness comes for
free for all binary demand problems; in the general demand case cost shares
for subsequent service levels must increase faster than valuations to achieve this
property. In both cases, online mechanisms are group-strategyproof if and only
if dropping out cannot help subsequent players. Consequently, we cannot expect
incremental cost sharing mechanisms for problems with congestion effects like
e.g. scheduling games to be group-strategyproof, whereas this seems easier for
network design problems. It would be interesting to see more applications to our
framework, possibly also when the online mechanisms are not directly derived
from competitive algorithms as in our incremental mechanisms.
We consider this work as a very natural and general starting point to ex-
ploit the possibilities and limits of cooperative cost sharing in different online
contexts. Our model restricts feasible allocations to a continuous sequence of ac-
cepts for each player, starting with their first request. This feature of the model
enhances truthfulness as it prevents players from underbidding to reject some
service request and then to obtain it later for a cheaper price. One interesting
line of research would therefore be to allow for more general mechanisms which
might accept further requests of players even after a request has been rejected.
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